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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Derrell'
(decided December 3, 2009)
Niven Derrell was charged with third degree criminal posses-
sion of a weapon for possession of a gravity knife,2 and fifth degree
criminal possession of a controlled substance3 for cocaine posses-
sion.4 Derrell was initially stopped by the New York City Police De-
partment ("NYPD") on suspicion of driving a vehicle with illegally
tinted windows.' The Supreme Court of New York County con-
ducted a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to
arrest Derrell and whether the gravity knife and cocaine recovered
from Derrell's automobile were admissible at trial.6 Derrell argued
that the search of his vehicle and subsequent seizure of property were
illegal because the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 12 of the
New York State Constitution.' The court determined probable cause
' 889 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
2 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265(5) (McKinney 2010) (defining a gravity knife as "any knife
which has a blade which is released from the handle or sheath thereof by the force of gravity
or the application of centrifugal force which, when released, is locked in place by means of a
button, spring, lever or other device.").
3 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06(5) (McKinney 2010) (stating "[a] person is guilty of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree when he knowingly and un-
lawfully possesses: (5.) cocaine and said cocaine weighs five hundred milligrams or more.").
4 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
Id. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(12-a)(b)(1-4) (McKinney 2010) amended by
2010 N.Y. SESS. LAWS Ch. 465 (McKinney) (effective August 31, 2010) (amending non-
pertinent areas of traffic code relating to emergency vehicles).
6 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."
Article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution states in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause .... "
605
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existed that Derrell violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by driving
with excessively tinted windows, and therefore the initial stop was
lawful.8 The court denied Derrell's motion to suppress the recovered
narcotics, but granted Derrell's motion to suppress the admission of
the gravity knife,9 holding the search of Derrell's automobile to be
illegal as violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the knife inadmissible as the fruits of an illegal
search.'o However, the court remained uncertain whether the search
violated article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution."
Police Officers Edgardo Cortes and Franklin Salinas observed
a four-door sedan driven by Derrell with apparently illegal tinted
windows on June 1, 2008, at approximately 2:00 a.m.12 After pulling
the vehicle over the officers confirmed via instruments that Derrell's
vehicle was unlawfully tinted.'3 The officers ran a record check on
Derrell, and learned that Derrell's driving privileges had been sus-
pended.14  During the records check, the officers observed Derrell
making furtive gestures, but were unable to see clearly into the ve-
hicle due to the excessive tint. '5 Police Officers Cortes and Salinas
contacted Officer Zabala and his partner, Officer Rodriguez, to effect
the arrest of Derrell.16 Derrell was handcuffed and escorted to Offic-
ers Zabala's and Rodriguez's patrol car which was parked approx-
imately fifty-feet from Derrell's vehicle. '7 A female passenger with
Derrell at the time of this incident was released and not charged.'8
While being placed into the patrol car, Officer Cortes observed Der-
rell reach towards his pocket or waist, and observed an item fall to
Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
9 Id. at 909; id at 914 (holding that because defendant denied a possessory interest in the
cocaine bags, he lacked standing to suppress cocaine evidence because he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy).
1o Id. at 917, 921.
SId. at 917, 919-21.
12 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
14 id
15 Id at 910-11 (quoting Officer Salinas' testimony: "I saw him moving a lot inside the
vehicle.").
1 Id. at 909-10, 912 (stating that Officers Cortes and Salinas, due to time constraints,
were unable to making the actual arrest; decisions regarding arrests or summons for violating
the tinted window regulations are discretionary, and Derrell could not drive once the Officers
discovered his driving privileges were suspended).
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the ground next to Derrell; however, the officer did not see Derrell
actually throw or drop any item.19 The fallen items were subsequent-
ly found to be eleven small clear bags of cocaine; Derrell denied the
drugs were his.20 Contemporaneously, Officer Salinas conducted a
search of Derrell's vehicle. 2' There is no evidence in the record that
Officer Salinas detected or suspected cocaine was present prior to be-
ginning his initial search.22 Officer Salinas "searched the front and
rear seats, the middle console and the doors."23 During the initial
search of the vehicle, Officer Salinas discovered a gravity knife.24
Officer Salinas testified that he searched the vehicle because it was
incidental to a lawful arrest and because of Derrell's furtive move-
ments.25 It is clear from the record that the female passenger never
posed a threat to the arresting officers;26 during the entire incident
she was standing on the sidewalk ten feet from the passenger side and
was never placed in handcuffs.27
Because the officers observed Derrell apparently driving with
excessively tinted windows, the trial court found probable cause ex-
isted to stop the vehicle for suspicion of violating the Vehicle and
Traffic Law.28 The court determined that Derrell lacked standing to
challenge the seizure of the cocaine.29
19 Id.
20 Id at 912 (stating the Officer knew the items were cocaine based on his training and
experience with narcotics).
21 Id. at 911 (stating that Officer Salinas began the initial search of Derrell's automobile
when Derrell was handcuffed and in the back of Officer Zabala's patrol car with Officers
Zabala and Cortes).
22 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (stating there is no indication in the record that Officer
Salinas was aware of the cocaine when beginning his search, and possible cocaine in the ve-
hicle formed no part of Salinas' motivation in performing the search).
23 Id. at 911.
24 Id. (stating a second search was conducted by the Officers, where nothing was found).
25 Id. at 910-11. Officer Salinas testified that he searched "all reachable, lungible areas . .
to where the motorist was seated" incident to arrest in order "[t]o make sure that there
wasn't anything in the car, anything that could harm us." Id. at 911.
26 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
27 Id. at 911.
28 Id at 913 (citing People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 641 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that
police do not require a warrant to stop a vehicle if probable cause exists)). See People v. Cu-
evas, 203 A.D.2d 88, 88 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994) (stating that observing a vehicle with
excessive tint justifies a stop of a vehicle) appeal denied, 637 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1994); see
also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(12-a)(b)(1-4).
29 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (holding Derrell had no subjective expectation of privacy
regarding narcotics found on the ground because he denied having a possessory interest in
3
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The Derrell court then analyzed the vehicle search subsequent
to the arrest under the United States and New York State Constitu-
tions.30
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees, as a fundamental principle, that the government may not
conduct a search of a citizen unless a search warrant is obtained from
a neutral magistrate showing probable cause exists to allow the
search.31 However, the Supreme Court has long held that "the ex-
igencies of the situation" make exemption from obtaining a warrant
at times "imperative." 3 2  Therefore, selected scenarios involving
searches conducted incidental to lawful arrests have become clearly
accepted as exceptions to the warrant requirement,3 3 while other sce-
the drug bags, and thus lacked standing to challenge the seizure by the police).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
3 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (" '[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judges or magistrates, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject to only a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.' " (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))). See
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981); see also People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420,
421-22 (N.Y. 1980) ("The privacy interest of our citizens is far too cherished a right to be
entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field."), rev'd, 453 U.S. at 462-63.
32 Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948)).
3 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (stating searches performed in-
cidental to arrest are legal where there is a need to seize weapons and other items which may
harm the public or the arresting officers, may affect an escape by the defendant, or to prevent
the destruction of evidence of the crime); see id. at 755-56 (stating searches performed di-
rectly on the person and their worn clothing incidental to a lawful arrest has been held valid
without a warrant) (" 'When a man is legally arrested ... whatever is found upon his person
or in his control ... may be seized and held as evidence . . . .' " (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925))); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)
(holding that discovery of narcotics during a pat down frisk performed during arrest of de-
fendant for driving with a revoked license, was a valid warrantless search under the search
incident doctrine (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63))); see also Gustafon v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260, 261 (1973) (holding a warrantless search of a cigarette box found to contain mari-
juana discovered in defendants coat pocket during an arrest frisk legal when defendant was
placed under arrest for driving without a license). The Supreme Court has held that if the
search could have legally been performed at the time of the arrest, the search could be legal-
ly performed many hours later after the defendant is placed in detention. See United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974) (holding because a search could have legally been in-
itially performed, the later performed search ten hours after arrest was still incidental to the
arrest because the fact of the arrest made the search permissible). A warrantless search of
vehicles where probable cause existed is legal where securing a warrant is not practical be-
cause the vehicle may be quickly moved out of the local area or jurisdiction. See Chimel,
395 U.S. at 764 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153). But compare with id. at 768 (holding that
police search of defendant's entire apartment far removed from the person or the area where
he conceivably might obtain a weapon or alter evidence against him, was "unreasonable"
4
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narios of warrantless searches of homes and vehicles incidental to a
lawful arrest have a lengthy and conflicting history, marked by con-
tradictory and at times confusing rulings by the United States Su-
preme Court and the lower federal courts.34
under the Fourth Amendment and thus illegal), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
11 (1977) (holding the warrantless search of a locked footlocker performed incidental to a
lawful arrest was illegal, because a locked footlocker has a greater expectation of privacy
than a person who is arrested has), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579
(1991).
34 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (stating in dictum that warrant-
less searches, incidental to a lawful arrest, is an exception to the Fourth Amendment, "al-
ways recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crimes."); Carroll, 267 U.S. at
158 ("When a man is legally arrested . .. whatever is found upon his person or in his control
... may be seized and held as evidence .... (emphasis added)). Compare Agnello v. Unit-
ed States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (stating in dictum "[t]he right without a search warrant
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other
things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted." (emphasis added)), and Mar-
ron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1927) (holding federal agents who secured a
warrant to seize illegal liquor, upon discovering persons selling and drinking liquor, arrested
the person in charge, and then executed the warrant; in searching the premises agents dis-
covered and seized an incriminating ledger not covered by the warrant; the Court upheld the
seizure because a lawful arrest was made and "they had a right without a warrant contempo-
raneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the crimi-
nal enterprise."), with Go-Bart Imp., Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931)
(holding a warrantless search of an arrested person's desk, safe, and parts of his office "un-
reasonable" and thus illegal because defendant committed no crime in the presence of the
agents; distinguishing Go-Bart from Marron, where defendant was engaged in criminal ac-
tivity in the presence of agents), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932)
(concurring with Go-Bart and holding unlawful a search of a desk and office cabinet despite
being incidental to a lawful arrest, because the searches were "exploratory and general");
compare also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 149, 151-52 (1947) (holding search of
defendant's entire four-room apartment incidental to arrest for defendant's alleged involve-
ment with cashing and interstate transportation of forged checks, was lawful; defendant con-
victed of violating Selective Training and Service Act when agents found in a desk drawer a
sealed envelope marked "George Harris, personal papers," which contained forged selective
service documents. The Court relied on Angello to allow a search of the entire premises),
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768, with Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705,
708 (1948) (holding seizure of illicit distillery contemporaneously to arrest of person in raid
of illicit distillery site was illegal because the agents easily could have obtained a valid war-
rant prior to the raid; the Court stated "[a] search or seizure without a warrant as an incident
to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of
the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something
more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that there is a valid
arrest does not ipso facto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant . .. [o]therwise the
exception swallows the general principle, making a search warrant completely unnecessary
wherever there is a lawful arrest. And so there must be some other factor in the situation that
would make it unreasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer to equip himself
5
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Chimel v. California3 5 articulated the basis for all modem ad-
judication of automobile searches incidental to lawful arrest cases.
"Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space
within an arrestee's 'immediate control,' meaning 'the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.' "3 Federal and state courts have discovered that the ap-
parently simple principle limiting searches incident to lawful arrests
in Chimel was difficult to apply to specific cases. Such confusion
ultimately weakens the Fourth Amendment's intended privacy pro-
tections when the government and citizens are unable to clearly and
with a search warrant."), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1950) (holding officers seizure of stamps with forged overprints in defendants office desk,
obtained via a search of over an hour and a half after defendant's arrest based on a valid ar-
rest warrant, was valid based on Harris; the Court rejected the Trupiano test of whether it is
reasonable to obtain a search warrant, but rather the test is whether the search itself was rea-
sonable), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 ("The search here went far beyond the peti-
tioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional
justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.
The scope of the search was, therefore, 'unreasonable' under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
" 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
36 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 768 (holding a search incidental to arrest may only include
"the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence."); Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-58 ("[T]he Court in Chimel found 'ample justification' for
a search of 'the area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence, . . . no comparable justification . . . for routinely searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all the
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.' " (quoting Chimel, 395
U.S. at 763)); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 619-20.
37 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
38 See Belton 453 U.S. at 458, 460 (stating that although Chimel established that a search
incidental to arrest could not go beyond the "area within the immediate control of the arres-
tee," courts have not found a workable definition of what this area is exactly defined as); see
also People v. Smith, 452 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1982) (explaining that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence's "underlying difficulty has its genesis in the formulation
of the governing rule by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California," specifi-
cally, the Chimel Court's language '[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence.' " (quoting Chimel 395 U.S. at 763)). Smith continues, "[T]wo questions which have
given rise to a variety ofjudicial approaches. One involved the question .. . the term 'within
his immediate control' or 'grabbable' area, as it has come to be called. The second was
whether the right to search within the defined area was limited by the stated reasons and
whether the right survived even where no practical possibility existed that the arrested per-
son could secure a weapon or destroy evidence." Smith, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
6
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easily know what the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protects.39
The Supreme Court in New York v. Belton applied Chimel to
warrantless vehicle searches incidental to a lawful arrest. 40 Belton
involved a New York State Trooper who stopped an automobile for
driving at an excessive speed.4 While conducting a check of the
driver's license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana
and observed an envelope he associated with marijuana. 42 The offic-
er ordered the occupants from the car, placed them under arrest, sepa-
rated and secured the four occupants roadside, and then searched the
passenger compartment of the car.43  The officer found a leather
jacket on the backseat of the car which contained cocaine in a zip-
pered pocket." Defendants moved to suppress the admission of the
cocaine as the fruits of an illegal search.4 5 The trial court denied the
motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed.46 The New York Court
of Appeals reversed, holding there was no longer any danger to the
officer or any possibility of loss of evidence because the jacket was
inaccessible to the defendants, 47 and therefore the search was an il-
legal warrantless search.48
3 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the
exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities
and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the con-
text of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly so-
phisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the
facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be 'literally impossible of ap-
plication by the officer in the field.' " (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudica-
tion" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127,
141 (1974) [hereinafter The Robinson Dilemma])).
40 See id. at 460 (holding that when police make a lawful arrest of an occupant of an au-
tomobile, the officer "may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passen-
ger compartment of that automobile."). Chimel's facts were in the context of police execut-
ing an arrest warrant at defendant's home, and the subsequent search by the police of the
entire home. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54.
41 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
42 Id. at 455-56.
43 Id. at 456.
'* Id
45 id
46 Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
47 Id. (" 'A warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not
be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the
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The Belton Supreme Court reversed, and established a bright-
line rule based on Chimel stating:
In order to establish the workable rule this category of
cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the lim-
its of the area that may be searched in light of that ge-
neralization. Accordingly, we hold that when a po-
liceman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contempora-
neous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile. Our holding today
does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's
principles in this particular and problematic context. It
in no way alters the fundamental principles established
in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."4 9
Belton 's bright-line rule was fashioned after the bright-line
rule in United States v. Robinson,so a case which dealt with searches
of the actual person.5 ' In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for
driving with a revoked license, and during the arrest pat down police
discovered narcotics on the defendant without first obtaining a war-
rant for the search.52 Both the warrantless searches of the person in
Robinson, and the vehicle search incidental to arrest in Belton, are al-
lowed based on the need to protect police or protect evidence from
destruction.53 Thus, just as in Robinson the allowable search of the
person could even be of containers or areas on the person which
physically could not contain a weapon or evidence, Belton followed
this concept and did not limit vehicle searches incidental to lawful ar-
rest to only situations where the defendant was physically inside the
49 Id. at 460; id. at 460, n.3.
50 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225-26, 236 (holding that discovery of narcotics during a pat
down frisk performed during arrest of defendant for driving with a revoked license was a
valid warrantless search under the search incident doctrine in Chimel).
51 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60 (referring to Robinson as "a straightforward rule, easily
applied, and predictably enforced[;]" while describing the Belton holding as "[iun order to
establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the
limits of the area that may be searched in light of that generalization . . . we hold that when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest . .. he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment .... ")
52 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220-23.
s3 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 462-63; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226, 236.
[Vol. 27612
8
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stopped vehicle, but extended it to situations where the defendant was
removed from the stopped vehicle by some undefined point of physi-
cal distance contemporaneous and connected to the arrest. 54
The core reasoning of Justice Stewart, writing the Belton plu-
rality opinion, was not agreed upon by a majority of the Justices. The
core holding of Belton was that the interior of a vehicle could be con-
sidered "the area within the immediate control of the arrestee," and
where he "might reach in order to grab a weapon or destroy eviden-
tiary item" as required by Chimel, even when the arrestee is outside
of the vehicle. 5 The Belton majority only reached its judgment by
relying on two concurring opinions which did not share Justice Ste-
wart's reasoning.56
The Belton dissent strongly argued that Belton was in reality
overruling Chimel.5 7 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the deci-
sion created a legal fiction that the interior of a car is always in the
immediate control of the arrestee,5 ' and ultimately argued that Belton
failed to create its stated objective of providing police officers with a
clear, workable standard because it leaves too many vague determina-
tions for police and citizens. 59  The Belton majority denied that the
54 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (" 'The authority to search . . . while based on the need to
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to the arrest requires no additional justification.' " (quoting Robinson 414 U.S. at 235)).
5 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
56 See id. at 454-55 (the opinion of the Court written by Justice Stewart, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun). Cf id. at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (joining the
reversal of the Court, but preferring that the case should have been decided by overruling
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusio-
nary rules were applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment), or in the alter-
native Justice Rehnquist would apply the "automobile exception" he argued for in dissent in
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joining with
Justice Blackmun in dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that automobiles should be a general
exception to the Fourth Amendment, and are constitutionally different than homes)).
5 Id. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Belton abandoned Chimel's prin-
ciples because Chimel was predicated on the safety of the arresting officers and preservation
of concealed or destructible evidence, only allowing substantially contemporaneous and in
the immediate vicinity of an arrest; these concerns did not exist when the defendants, such as
in Belton, were separated and unable to reach the jacket. Absent these concerns, Chimel
does not allow exceptions to the warrant requirement).
" Id. at 466.
s9 Belton, 453 U.S. at 466, 469-71 (stating the Court's decision leaves too many unans-
wered questions for the police to be a useful bright-line rule, among them: how long after an
9
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decision overruled Chimel.60
The Supreme Court's next major revisit of an automobile
search incidental to lawful arrest case was in Thornton v. United
States.6 ' Thornton involved a police officer who observed an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant with license tags issued to another
vehicle. 62 Before the officer was able to pull over the vehicle, the de-
fendant drove into a parking lot, parked, and left the vehicle.63 The
officer approached the defendant who was now on foot, found mari-
juana and crack cocaine in the defendant's pocket, and subsequently
arrested him.64 The officer searched the vehicle incidental to the ar-
rest, and found a handgun under the driver's seat. Defendant was
charged with federal drug and gun charges.66 The Federal District
Court held the search valid under Belton, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 67  Arguably, Thornton68
extended Belton6 9 because the contact with defendant in Thornton
did not occur until after the defendant was removed from the vehicle,
and there is less connection between the defendant's arrest and the
vehicle.70 Thornton, like Belton, failed to reach a majority on the un-
derlying reasoning of the case,7' and required two concurring opi-
arrest may a Belton search be performed; five minutes, thirty minutes, three hours; does it
matter how close the defendant is to the vehicle; does it include locked glove compartments,
under floor boards, or interiors of door panels?).
60 Id. at 462-63 (majority opinion).
6' 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
62 Id. at 617-18.
61 Id. at 618.
SId
65 Id.
66 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.
67 Id. at 619.
68 See id. at 617 (holding Belton allowed a search of a defendant who was a recent occu-
pant of a vehicle where the defendant was stopped by police, accosted, frisked, and found to
possess marijuana and cocaine. Incidental to the arrest the vehicle was searched without a
warrant and a handgun was found).
69 See id. at 617, 619-21 (holding that Belton applies "even when an officer does not make
contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle." Yet, stating that Belton "placed no re-
liance on the fact" that the defendants were ordered out of the car, or when the officer in-
itiated the contact; Belton's logic of creating a bright-line rule should not logically create
such distinctions).
70 See id. at 619 (rejecting defendant's argument that Belton is limited to cases where the
officer initiated contact with the defendant while still an occupant of the vehicle).
71 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 616-17 (Thornton reached a majority in judgment, affirming
the lower court; Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 624-25 (O'Connor & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
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nions to reach a judgment.72 The plurality opinion in Thornton con-
tinued the same application of Chimel to Thornton 's facts as was held
in Belton; namely, allowing a warrantless search even though the ar-
restee was secured and removed from the searched vehicle. 73 Justice
Scalia concurred in judgment in Thornton only because the officers
had a reasonable belief that evidence related to the arresting crime
was in the vehicle.7 4  Justice Scalia argued for discarding altogether
Belton 's application of Chimel to vehicle searches incidental to law-
ful arrests, 7  because the doctrine of viewing the inside of a vehicle to
be within the immediate control of an arrestee who is physically re-
moved from the vehicle and secured stretches the doctrine "beyond
its breaking point." 76 Justice Scalia would only allow a search inci-
dental to lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence rele-
vant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.77 This ap-
proach narrows the exception to the Fourth Amendment, and
Justice Scalia argued searches based on seeking evidence of the crime
committed have a long judicial history in English and American
law. 79
72 Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that although Thornton is a logical ex-
tension of Belton, she is dissatisfied with the state of the law in searches of vehicles inciden-
tal to arrest, because Belton is on a "shaky foundation," and quoting Justice Scalia's concur-
rence "lower courts decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the
arrest ... as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales
of Chimel .... "); id. at 625, 628-29, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the accepted ra-
tional of Belton to an approach that allows the search simply because the vehicle may con-
tain evidence relevant to the crime for which the defendant was arrested for. In the facts of
Thornton, this analysis produces his concurrence affirming the lower court, but on other
grounds).
7 Id. at 617, 620-21(majority opinion).
74 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In this case, as in Belton, petitioner
was lawfully arrested for a drug offense. It was reasonable .. . to believe that further contra-
band or similar evidence relevant to the crime for which he had been arrested might be found
in the vehicle from which he had just alighted and which was still within his vicinity at the
time of arrest. I would affirm the decision below on that ground.").
7 Id. at 629 (majority opinion) ("If Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because the
arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the car
might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.").
76 Id. at 625.
n Id. at 632.
78 Id. at 630 ("The fact of prior lawful arrest distinguishes the arrestee from society at
large, and distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general rummaging.").
7 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 ("Numerous earlier authorities support this approach, refer-
ring to the general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with no men-
tion of the more specific interest in preventing its concealment or destruction.").
11
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Justice Scalia's concurrence is noteworthy for a number of
reasons. First, Justice Scalia articulated an opinion that echoed Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent in Belton regarding whether the Belton holding
can actually be reconciled with Chimel, stating:
[I]f we are going to continue to allow Belton searches
on stare decisis grounds, we should at least be honest
about why we are doing so. Belton cannot reasonably
be explained as a mere application of Chimel. Rather,
it is a return to the broader sort of search incident to
arrest that we allowed before Chimel-limited, of
course, to searches of motor vehicles, a category of
'effects' which give rise to a reduced expectation of
privacy. 80
While Justice Brennan stated in Belton, that the decision
"carves out a dangerous precedent that is not justified by the concerns
underlying Chimel."8 ' Second, Justice Scalia illuminated the inhe-
rent difficulties in the application of Chimel to vehicle searches inci-
dental to lawful arrest over the last four decades. 82 Third, the opinion
80 See id. at 631.
81 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463, 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan did not
reach Justice Scalia's conclusion in Thornton, because Justice Brennan narrowly applied
Chimel, only allowing searches that have one or both of the Chimel factors of protecting the
police or evidence. Id. at 464-66. On the other hand, Justice Scalia categorically allowed
any search incidental to arrest if the search is related to evidence of the crime alleged, re-
gardless if there is a safety or possible evidence destruction potential. Thornton, 541 U.S. at
631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625-29. Justice Scalia discussed and rejected three possible rea-
sons the search in Thornton might have been justified to protect police officers or prevent
evidence destruction. First, although handcuffed and in the back of the patrol car, defendant
theoretically might escape and retrieve a weapon or evidence from his vehicle. Justice Sca-
lia rejected this, quoting Judge Goldberg who called such a proposition a reference to the
mythical arrestee "possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules." United
States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973). Justice Scalia pointed out that the United
States in their brief pointed to seven instances over thirteen years where state or federal of-
ficers were attacked with weapons by handcuffed arrestees. He asserted that this does not
create a safety concern in reality. Three of the cases involved weapons that remained con-
cealed on the person, three more involved weapons seized from the arresting officers, while
only one case involved an arrestee who escaped a patrol car and ran through a forest to a
house where he struck an officer while still handcuffed with a fireplace poker. Justice Scalia
pointed out that it can hardly be a danger justifying searches if there is no documented case
of a handcuffed arrestee retrieving weapons from his former car, even though arresting
people in this context is fairly common. Second, since the officer could have searched the
vehicle when the defendant was in the car, the officer should not be penalized for taking the
12
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presented a new understanding of Belton8 3 which provided much of
the doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court's future ruling al-
tering searches of automobiles incidental to arrests in Arizona v.
Gant.84 Justice O'Connor in her separate Thornton concurrence ex-
pressed support for Justice Scalia's views, and stated they were on
"firmer ground" than Belton, but she was hesitant to adopt Justice
Scalia's views without the government or petitioner having had an
opportunity to argue the case on the merits.
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant86 embraced a new,
prudent precaution of safely securing the defendant before searching the vehicle. Justice
Scalia rejected this logic, pointing out that the search allowed under Chimel is an exception,
only allowed by circumstances, to conduct normally unlawful searches. It is not a Govern-
mental right. Third, while true that no danger existed to the police or evidence, Belton ar-
gued for a bright-line rule which would justify cases that normally would be unreasonable.
Justice Scalia pointed out that such an argument is only valid if it is accurate, as Belton
claims, "that the passenger compartment is 'in fact generally, even if not inevitably,' within
the suspect's immediate control." Thornton, 591 U.S. at 627. Reality is far from this pre-
mise. Justice Scalia pointed out that near universal police practice is to secure a defendant in
handcuffs and to place an arrestee into the squad car before performing a search. In reality,
the passenger compartment is never within the arrestee's control. See id. at 625-29.
" Id. at 629, 631-32 (stating that Belton should be recast to allow searches of cars because
the car may contain evidence relevant to the crime for which the defendant was arrested).
This view of Belton would align Belton to Robinson which abandoned the two Chimel fac-
tors in searches incident to arrest of the actual person.
84 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714, 1723-24 (holding even if Chimel's factors are inapplicable to
allow a warrantless search because the arrestee is removed from the vehicle and physically
secured, when it is reasonable to believe evidence of the arresting crime is in the vehicle a
warrantless search may still be performed).
85 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). The facts of Gant involved police initially responding to an
anonymous tip that a residence was being used to sell drugs. Upon arriving at the home, the
police knocked on the door. Gant answered, identified himself and stated the owner of the
home was expected later. The police conducted a records check and discovered Gant had an
open warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. Returning later that even-
ing, the police found a man near the back of the home, and a woman in a parked car. The
man was arrested for giving a false name, and the woman for drug paraphernalia possession.
Both were handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. Gant then arrived driving his vehicle.
Gant parked his car, got out, and shut the door. An officer about thirty feet from Gant called.
to him, and the officer and Gant met approximately ten-twelve feet from Gant's car. Gant
was immediately arrested and handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car. After being placed in
the patrol car, Gant's car was searched. The officers discovered a gun, and a bag of cocaine
in the pocket of a jacket which was on the backseat. The trial court held police had no prob-
able cause to search the vehicle, but because the officers saw Gant commit the crime of driv-
ing without a license, the search incident to this lawful arrest was permissible. The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed, holding the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The majority and dissent focused on whether Belton would
or would not allow a search in this fact pattern. Id. at 1714-1716.
13
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narrow view of Belton tied to Chimel; holding Chimel's safety and
evidence protections are strictly determinative of Belton 's scope."
Gant interpreted that Belton should not allow a search of an automo-
bile incidental to lawful arrest when the occupant is no longer in the
stopped vehicle, is secured, and unable to access the interior of the
vehicle. 8 Gant steadfastly denied it was overturning Belton, while
simultaneously acknowledging that most authorities did not read Bel-
ton to be in concert with its new Gant interpretation.89 The holding
in Gant simultaneously holds a vehicle search incidental to a lawful
arrest where the occupant is no longer in the vehicle, is secured, and
unable to access the interior of the vehicle is illegal,90 but also holds
of an expansive vehicle exception not tethered at all to Chimel;91 spe-
cifically, allowing the police to search a vehicle incident to a lawful
arrest when it is reasonable for the arresting officer to believe that
evidence of the arresting crime may be found in the vehicle, regard-
less of the lack of ability by the arrestee to harm officers or destroy
evidence.92
Prior to Gant the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals had
varied opinions whether the inside of the vehicle must actually be
within the defendant's reach to allow a warrantless search incidental
to lawful arrest. 93 However, post-Gant current federal law under the
" Id. at 1714.
88 id
89 Id. at 1718-22. The Gant dissent strongly disagreed with this characterization, insisting
the Gant majority actually overturned established precedent under Chimel and Belton. See
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Principles of stare decisis must apply, and
those who wish this Court to change a well-established legal precedent . .. bear a heavy bur-
den."); id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the majority holding as effectively overruling
Belton, and stating "[a]lthough the Court refuses to acknowledge that it is overruling Belton
and Thornton, there can be no doubt that it does so").
90 Id. at 1714.
9' Id.
92 Id. (following Thornton and Justice Scalia's suggestion in his Thornton concurrence,
the context of an automobile allows a search incident to lawful arrest of a vehicle when it is
reasonable for the arresting officers to believe evidence of the arresting offense might be
found in the vehicle).
9 Compare Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19 n.2 (comparing United States v. Green, 324 F.3d
375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Belton did not authorize a search of an arrestee's ve-
hicle when he was handcuffed and lying face down on the ground surrounded by four police
officers 6-to-10 feet from the vehicle); United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 938-39 (10th
Cir. 2001) (finding a vehicle search conducted while the arrestee was handcuffed in the back
of a patrol car illegal); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding a
vehicle search conducted thirty to forty-five minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had
618 [Vol. 27
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Fourth Amendment does not allow a warrantless search of a vehicle
incidental to the occupant's arrest if the arrestee is secured and no
longer able to access the interior of the vehicle. 94 If however, a rea-
sonable possibility exists that there is evidence in the vehicle directly
relating to the crime for which the defendant was lawfully arrested, a
separate non-Chimel search of the vehicle is justified based solely on
searching for relevant evidence reasonably related to the arresting
crime.9'
Because Gant is current law, Derrell correctly held that the
search conducted by the police violated Derrell's Fourth Amendment
rights because the police searched his automobile without a war-
rant.96 Derrell left the exact parameters of New York Constitutional
law to a theoretical question, because under Gant any interpretation
of New York law would be unconstitutional. 97
The language of the New York State Constitution protecting
citizens against unlawful searches and seizures is identical to the
Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution.9 8  However,
been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police car illegal), with United States v.
Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a search conducted an hour after the
arrestee was apprehended and after he had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a pa-
trol car), overruled by Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104,
1106-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding a search conducted ten to fifteen minutes after an arrest
and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car), overruled
by Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; and United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1989)
(upholding a search conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the
back of a police cruiser), overruled by Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719).
94 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714, 1716 (holding that the "safety and evidentiary justifications
underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope." "If there is no possi-
bility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search,
both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not
apply.").
95 Id. at 1714 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). It is not at all
clear where the Gant Court found Thornton to endorse Justice Scalia's opinion that the au-
tomobile justifies a search incident to arrest even if outside of Chimel to find further evi-
dence of the arresting crime. Thornton appears clearly to reject this view. See Thornton,
541 U.S. at 624 n.4 (stating that although Justice Scalia's view may have merits, Thornton is
"the wrong case in which to address them" to decide based on Justice Scalia's views).
96 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 909, 917-18, 921-22. Derrell's facts do support a warrantless
search for evidence related to the arresting crime of driving with tinted windows and a sus-
pended license.
9 Id. at 916-17.
98 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ..... Ar-
ticle I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The right of
15
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currently and historically,99 the New York State Constitution is eva-
luated differently than the United States Constitution.'o The differ-
ences, if any, between federal law and New York State law may
hinge to a large degree on how Belton is understood.
Prior to Gant, as stated in Derrell, New York case law appar-
ently protected the privacy interests of a party more than the Belton
era bright-line rule,'o' because New York law required a case-by-case
inquiry to determine at the time of arrest whether the officers were at
potential risk from the defendant, or if a potential for destruction of
evidence existed.102 Under the predominant pre-Gant understanding
of Belton, no case-by case inquiry was required under federal law,
and any search of a vehicle incidental to a lawful arrest was allowed
regardless if the arrestee could access the stopped vehicle at the time
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated; and no warrants can issue but upon probable cause . . . ." See People v.
Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (N.Y. 1983) ("[Bloth [the] Federal and State warrant re-
quirements derive from the common law." (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973))).
9 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226 (stating the United States Supreme Court understands the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to require drawing a bright line "for
reasons of efficiency between permissible searches and impermissible searches, even though
the result is occasionally to forbid a reasonable search or permit an unreasonable one" (citing
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235)). The New York State Constitution requires that the reasonable-
ness of each search must be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each
case. Id at 1226-27 (citing People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571 (N.Y. 1976)); id. at
1227 (noting under Belton the Federal Constitution allows the search of a closed container
taken from the person or in the " 'grabbable area' accessible to the person arrested, even
though the police have no reason to fear for their safety," while the New York State Consti-
tution is not so broad; exigent circumstance of possible destruction of evidence or police
safety must exist). However, the state allows searches based on the circumstances which
exist at the time of the arrest even though the arrestee is subdued and the object searched is
under exclusive police control. Id. (citing Belton, 407 N.E.2d at 423 n.2). The search must
not be " 'significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest.' " Id. (quoting People v.
De Santis, 385 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1978), overruled by Belton, 407 N.E.2d at 422 n.1 ("To the
extent that these cases may be read to suggest otherwise, they are disapproved.")).
'* Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (stating that "under the law in effect in New York prior
to Gant, in contrast to the Gant decision, the question was not whether, at the time a search
was conducted, a defendant, in reality, could jeopardize the safety of an officer or the preser-
vation of evidence. The inquiry considered whether such circumstances existed before the
search was made, so long as the relevant criteria existed at the time of the arrest and the ar-
rest and search were sufficiently close in space and time. In this respect the Federal Consti-
tution now arguably imposes more restrictions on an officer's exercise of the right to search
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of the search.' 03 This predominate reading of Belton, embraced both
by the majority in Gant as the pre-Gant reading of Belton'" and in
Derrell, resulted in New York law being more protective of Fourth
Amendment privacy interests. First, New York law required an indi-
vidual inquiry into each case and rejected applying a Belton type
bright-line rule.'os Second, New York remained more faithful to a
literal reading of Chimel by requiring the actual existence of a risk to
police or real potential destruction of evidence at the time of the ar-
rest; this effectively is more limiting on police in their ability to
search without a warrant. 0
According to this predominate reading of Belton, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gant significantly changed the landscape of both
federal and New York State law by switching to a requirement that a
search of a vehicle incidental to lawful arrest required a strict adhe-
rence to Chimel's twin dictates of an actual risk to the officers, or ac-
tual potential loss of evidence relating to the arresting crime, not at
the time of arrest, but at the time of the search.'0 ' According to the
new view held in Gant, when an arrestee is secured in the patrol car,
no lawful search would be allowed because at the time of the search
no risk to officers or evidence destruction exists. As stated in Der-
rell, New York law accordingly would be unconstitutional because
New York case law previously allowed a determination of potential
risk to the officers, or evidence destruction determined at the time of
the arrest, not the time of the search; Gant held a search predicated
on the time of arrest unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; the risk to officers, or potential evi-
dence loss must exist at the time of the actual search for the warrant-
less search to be constitutional.'0 8
It is analytically relevant to examine the various opinions in
Gant itself to understand how Derrell concluded that New York law
is more lenient than post-Gant and thus unconstitutional. Approach-
ing the issues from one of the alternative views expressed in Gant
may result in conclusions different than those reached by Derrell.
103 Id. at 915-16.
'0 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718.
1os Smith, 457 N.E.2d at 1226-27; Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
'" See Smith, 457 N.E.2d at 1227.
107 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719, 1723-24; Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 915-17.
'0 See Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
2011] 621
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Two divergent views are expressed in the Gant dissent.'09
Justice Breyer doctrinally agreed with the majority, but principles of
stare decisis compelled him to dissent."o Justice Alito joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, fundamentally disagree
with the majority on how to understand Belton' and Chimel.112 Im
portantly, according to Justice Alito's view of Belton, the determina-
tion of the area of possession and control of the defendant required by
Chimel to allow a warrantless search incidental to arrest is based on
the time of arrest, not the time of the search; a markedly different
view than the traditional understanding of Belton."3 According to
109 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1726-27 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing).
110 Id at 1725-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he simultaneously agrees that Justice
Alito's reading of Belton establishing a clear bright-line rule is the "best read" of Belton,
while agreeing with Justice Stevens' majority holding in Gant that the accepted reading of
Belton produces rulings inconsistent with its underlying Fourth Amendment justifications.
In the abstract, he would look for a better rule than Belton, but the issue before the Court is
not of first impression, rather an issue with a long judicial history and established precedents.
For reasons of stare decisis, he dissented).
"' Id. at 1727 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that Belton itself expressly acknowledged that
articles in vehicles may not always be within the reach of the arrestee, "but '[i]n order to es-
tablish the workable rule this category of cases requires,' the Court adopted a rule that cate-
gorically permits the search of car's passenger compartment incident to the lawful arrest of
an occupant"). Justice Alito further stated that "[t]he precise holding in Belton could not be
clearer," and "[c]ontrary to the Court's suggestion, however, Justice Brennan's Belton dis-
sent did not mischaracterize ... or cause the holding to be misinterpreted. As noted, the Bel-
ton Court explicitly stated precisely what it held." Id.
112 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1730 (stating that Chimel's holding confining searches to the area
of " 'the arrestee's person' and 'the area from with he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence' " did not explicitly state if this meant accessible to arrestee at the time
of the arrest or at the time of the search. Justice Alito argued it must be the latter). Justice
Alito's conclusion is premised on the fact that even at the time Chimel was decided, officers
making an arrest were able to first handcuff and secure the an-estee; importantly, this is the
safer practice that logically is the prevalent practice. "Thus, if the arrestee's place was de-
fined by the time of search, rather time of arrest, the rule would rarely, if ever come into
play." Id. at 1730. Additionally, Justice Alito points out that handcuffs were available in
1969 as they are today. Chimel understood as applying to time of the search, would create a
perverse incentive to the police to not properly secure the arrestee, to allow them greater lati-
tude to gather important evidence which once handcuffed and secured would be unavailable
to them, "if this is the law, 'the law would truly be, as Mr. Bumble said, 'a[sic] ass.' " Id at
1730 (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Based on
these arguments, Justice Alito concludes that Chimel must have meant articles in the reach of
the arrestee at the time of his or her arrest, irrespective of being within the reach of the arres-
tee at the actual time of the search. Id.
"3 See id. at 1730-31. Cf id. at 1714, 1716-19, 1721 n.8 (majority opinion) (holding of
the broader view of Belton which requires all pertinent Chimel determinations to be based on
the actual time of the search, not the arrest).
18
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this view, Belton did not expand Chimel, but simply eliminated the
pre-Belton requirement deciding on a case-by-case basis whether the
arrestee was or was not able to reach the item when seated in the car
at the time of arrest. 114 Under Justice Alito's view of Belton, if an ar-
restee was secured in the patrol car at the time of the search, the war-
rantless search would be permitted as long as at the time of arrest a
risk to the arresting officers or loss of evidence existed, even though
at the moment of the search, no such concerns exist.1' According to
this understanding of Belton, federal and New York State law are
nearly identical; as both federal and New York State law require an
inquiry focusing on the existence of Chimel's factors at time of the
arrest. The only differences between federal and New York law un-
der Justice Alito's understanding of Belton, would be the Supreme
Court's application of a bright-line rule in Belton determining that
everything within a vehicle is within the reachable area of an arres-
114 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1730-31(Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that according to his reading
of Chimel and Belton, if the Court decides to reexamine Belton, it must actually reexamine
Chimel upon which Belton is securely based). Additionally, Justice Alito argued that regard-
less of how Belton and Chimel are understood, principles of stare decisis require allowing
vehicle searches incidental to a lawful arrest even when the arrestee is handcuffed and se-
cured from the scene. See id. at 1727-28. Acknowledging that "stare decisis is not an 'in-
exorable command,' " Justice Alito discussed at length why in Gant principles of stare deci-
sis should hold; specifically, because no "special justifications" warrant abandoning the
present state of the law, and five factors which are weighed in deciding whether to invoke or
reject stare decisis. Id. at 1727-28 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
Specifically, reliance, changed circumstances, workability, consistency with later cases, and
bad reasoning, all point to maintaining stare decisis of the prevalent traditional view of Bel-
ton and allowing searches incident to arrest even when the arrestee is secured. See id at
1728-31 (arguing because Belton has been taught for twenty-eight years in police academies,
there is significant reliance on the previous ruling; the circumstances of arrests today are not
changed since Belton was decided twenty-eight years ago, and the unlikely return of a hand-
cuffed arrestee to the vehicle to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence is identical now as
when Belton decided; the Belton rule has not proven to be unworkable; Belton has not been
undermined by later cases, rather it was reaffirmed in 2004 by Thornton; and Belton was not
based on bad reasoning. Based on Justice Alito's view that Belton's determination of threat
to the officers or potential evidence destruction meant at the time of the arrest, Belton was a
modest step post Chimel, simply avoiding a case-by-case determination of the arrestees
reach at the time of arrest). Although Belton is not always perfectly clear, according to Jus-
tice Alito it is clearer than the new two-part rule articulated by the Gant Court; first, requir-
ing a determination whether or not the arrestee is or is not within reach of the interior at the
time of the search. This is a case-by-case determination; second, requiring officers in the
field to determine whether the vehicle reasonably contains evidence specifically connected
to the crime an arrestee was detained for. Neither step is clear independently, certainly not
when both are required. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1729.
us See id. at 1730-31.
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tee,"' while New York would require an individual determination
based on each case's facts and circumstances to determine the rea-
sonableness of each individual search." 7
Justice Scalia in concurrence" with Gant strikes out a third
6 Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226 (stating for "reasons of efficiency" a bright-line is allowed
under the Federal Constitution (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235)).
" Id. at 1226-27. Derrell pointed out that beyond the core ruling of Gant, New York law
is essentially identical to federal law in regards to other possible issues involved with war-
rantless searches of vehicles incidental to lawful arrest. Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 919-20.
For instance, regarding whether vehicle searches are justified by the 'vehicle exception' rule.
Id. at 919 (stating that under New York law, when "an arrest is made and there is 'reason to
believe that the vehicle . . . may be related to the crime for which the arrest is being
made[,]' " a warrantless search may be conducted under the "vehicle exception" rule) (quot-
ing People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745, 748 (1982), rev'g 407 N.E.2d 420, rev'd by, 453 U.S.
454). Derrell noted that the "automobile exception" rule under New York State law over-
laps, and is essentially the same as the second prong of Gant which allowed a special catego-
ry of searches for vehicles where there is reason to believe there is evidence of the arresting
crime in the vehicle. Id. New York and federal law post-Gant are identical as far as allow-
ing a vehicle search regardless of the existence of potential officer safety or evidence de-
struction factors, where the police have a reasonable basis to believe that evidence for the
crime that the arrestee was arrested for may be present in the vehicle. See id. at 918-19.
The presence of a passenger in a defendant's vehicle who was not arrested, but posed a rea-
sonable suspicion of danger or a threat, was held to allow a warrantless search in Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983); New York State law is identical. See Derrell, 889
N.Y.S.2d at 919. Derrell continued by exploring the 'inevitable discovery doctrine,' which
holds that evidence obtained from an illegal search which would have been discovered in the
normal course of an investigation or inventory, is admissible. Under New York State law,
the "inevitable evidence doctrine" has limitations, which depends upon whether it is applied
to "primary evidence" or "secondary evidence." "Primary evidence," which is subject to
exclusion, is evidence "illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequences of the
challenged police conduct." "Secondary evidence," which is evidence "obtained indirectly
as a result of leads or information gained from that primary evidence," is admissible under
the "inevitable discovery doctrine." See id. at 920. Under federal law, the "inevitable dis-
covery doctrine" allows searches forbidden under Gant, when the government proves that
the evidence would have inevitably been discovered and the government can "establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means." United States v. Morillo, No. 08 CR 676, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94396, *25-26 (E.D.N.Y. October 9, 2009) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 (1984)). However, the court must find "with a high level of confidence, that each of the
contingencies necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would be resolved
in the government's favor." It is not enough that there is a "reasonable probability that the
contested evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police
misconduct." See United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, differences
exist between New York and Federal law regarding searches incident to lawful arrests in-
volving vehicles, when the issue involves the "inevitable discovery doctrine."
"' Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing his view of abandoning
Chimel and Belton as not shared by any other Justice, and faced "with a 4-to-I -to-4 opinion
that leaves the governing rule uncertain," Justice Scalia chose between the 'two evils' and
for the sake of higher degree of certainty for police officers, sided with the majority, as the
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position.119 According to Justice Scalia, the Court should overrule
both Belton and Thornton, and hold that vehicle searches incidental
to lawful arrests are allowed as long as the object searched is evi-
dence of the crime arrested for, or of another crime that the arresting
officer has reasonable cause to believe occurred.120  Justice Scalia
pointed out that Gant attempted to continue to apply Chimel to ve-
hicle searches, and would only allow officers to search vehicles inci-
dent to arrest "so long as the 'arrestee is within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search.' "121 Justice
Scalia posited that this Gant standard lacks clear guidance for the ar-
resting officers, and potentially would allow manipulation by officers
purposely leaving a non-violent arrest scene unsecure solely to allow
a warrantless vehicle search.122 Justice Scalia further argued that the
continued adherence to Belton 's and Thornton 's officer safety re-
quirement is a "charade," because the normal sequence of an arrest
dictates that the person being arrested is first secured and removed,
and then a search is contemplated.123
Derrell clearly does not embrace Justice Alito's or Justice
Scalia's view of Belton or what Gant accomplished, because follow-
ing either justice's view would have led the Derrell court to different
dissent approach "is the greater evil.").
"' Id. at 1724-25.
120 id.
121 Id. at 1724.
122 Id. at 1724-25 (stating the concern of manipulation would exist in cases where danger-
ous suspects are not involved, specifically, because the Gant holding creates a disincentive
for police to secure the scene; once the scene is secure, Chimel blocks any further warrant-
less searches).
123 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (pointing out that the risk to officers in vehicle stops is
at its height at the time of the initial officer-citizen confrontation, and is never reduced by
allowing a search of the vehicle after the driver is arrested and secured in a patrol car). Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out that the government has failed to provide a single incidence of a se-
cured arrestee escape, which then retrieved a weapon from their formerly driven vehicle.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice Scalia countered
Justice Alito's numerous arguments based on stare decisis; specifically, regarding his argu-
ments concerning no reason to limit searches to cases where evidence of the crime exists,
and in the difficulty for officers in administering the standard. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725
(rejecting stare decisis instantly, because Belton was "badly reasoned" and produced uncons-
titutional results that were based on "fanciful reliance upon officer safety"; further arguing
that searches based on reasonably finding evidence of the arresting crime ties the arresting
triggering event to the scope of the search, while Belton, based on exigency concepts, allows
searches at the time when the concept is least applicable, i.e. after arrest, and the defendant is
secured from the scene).
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conclusions.124
However, as stated in Derrell,125 post the holding in Gant the
discussion of what New York law held is largely irrelevant, because
according to Gant New York's time of arrest determination of the
Chimel factors violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,126 because New York case law as stated in Derrell is
more lenient towards the police, allowing more invasion of privacy
than the Supreme Court would allow in Gant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.127
It is clear that prior to Gant vehicle searches incidental to law-
ful arrest had become erroneously perceived as a police right, and not
the exception to the Fourth Amendment which they truly are.128
Such a perception is fundamentally troubling, and a very dangerous
proposition. Troubling because vehicle searches incidental to lawful
arrests were not tied to the Fourth Amendment, and essentially were a
government invasion of its citizens outside of the law. A government
operating outside of the laws inevitably leads to further egregious
government abuses. Additionally, the underlying legal legitimacy al-
lowing vehicle searches incident to lawful arrest; Chimel's twin fac-
tors, pre-Gant had become a "charade." 29
Gant in this sense re-tethered vehicle searches incidental to
lawful arrests to Chimel and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.130
However, post Gant a major problem which has persisted since the
inception of Belton remains; the fact that police officers in the field,
who are under stressful and rapidly changing circumstances,'' are
still expected to make subtle, abstract determinations of possible
124 Compare supra p. 621 and notes 107-08, with supra pp. 621-25 and accompanying
notes.
125 See Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
126 id
127 id
128 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718 (majority opinion) (" '[L]ower court decisions seem now to
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police en-
titlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.' " (quoting
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); id. at 1718-19 (quoting Thornton,
541 U.S. at 628-29 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating Justice Scalia's similar observation, and
some courts have allowed searches under Belton even after the arrestee has left the scene).
129 See id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130 See id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
13' See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting The Robinson Dilemma, supra note 39, at 141).
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threats to their safety or possible evidence destruction.132  This is
both impractical and seemingly absurd. Moreover, such a state of the
law leaves room for possible police abuses through purposeful police
manipulations to leave arrestees and crime scenes unsecured to gain
further evidence without a warrant.'3 3  Pre-Gant New York law as
expressed in Derrell was even more difficult and impractical than
federal law, because New York law required a field determination by
police whether at the time of arrest the area police seek to search is or
is not within the immediate area under the control and reach of the
arrestee,13 4 and then a determination by the courts in each case
whether this was a correct decision. ' Logically, this should simply
be too difficult to expect police officers to make such field determi-
nations. On a more fundamental level this is most problematic, be-
cause it causes police and citizens to lack clarity whether a warrant is
or is not required, thus diluting the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment and weakening fundamental freedoms. 136
Accepting this logical premise and observation, arguably New
York law pre-Gant as expressed by Derrell was actually not more
protective of privacy rights, but actually contributed to less Fourth
Amendment protection because of the confusion and lack of clarity
the New York rule apparently created for police and citizens. 137
The only approach which simultaneously is firmly tethered to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and creates the clearest, definable
exception to the Fourth Amendment, which facilitates the greatest po-
lice and citizen certainty of what and where a warrantless search is
permissible, is Justice Scalia's Gant concurrence."' Justice Scalia's
opinion removes the entire murky area of "within the reach" of the
arrestee issue, as well as removing the "charade" of Belton creating a
fantasy exception for safety and evidence concerns; a concern which
in reality does not exist because arrestees are almost always secured
and removed from the vehicle prior to a search being conducted.139
132 See The Robinson Dilemma, supra note 39, at 141.
1 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S2d at 916-17.
.. Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226-27.
136 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
13 See The Robinson Dilemma, supra note 39, at 141.
138 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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By no longer applying Chimel to the vehicle search context, ample
protections exist limiting the search exception to only cases where
there is an arrest, and only to searches reasonably connected to the
arresting crime.' 40 Searches with no reasonable connection to the ar-
resting crime, would be illegal.141 Only warrantless vehicle searches
incidental to a lawful arrest with a reasonable connection between the
search and the reason officers are arresting the defendant are permit-
ted.142 This approach is simpler because the same thought process
allowing the officer to arrest for probable cause continues to be the
officer's guide whether a search can or cannot be conducted.143 Be-
cause the factor of a defendant being secured is irrelevant, police ma-
nipulation is not an issue under this approach, and no complicated
spatial and temporal decisions need to be contemplated by the arrest-
ing officers.'" Police and citizens both would have a clear under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment; warrants are required, except
when a person is lawfully arrested, and the police have a reasonable
belief that evidence relating to the arresting crime may be found in
the vehicle. Such a search is allowed solely, and only because it is
incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, the Gant majority opinion it-
self accepted Justice Scalia's exception allowing warrantless searches
for evidence reasonably related to the arresting crime. 145 Apparently,
the Gant Court was trying to have all positions simultaneously; keep
Chimel applicable to vehicles, and allow evidence relating to the ar-
resting crime regardless of Chimel.146 For the sake of police and citi-
zen clarity, and ultimately greater privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment, requires a revisit of the entire application of Chimel to
140 See id at 1724-25; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629-30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629-30.
142 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25.
I43 See id.
'" See id. at 1724-25.
145 See id. at 1714 (majority opinion) (following Thornton and Justice Scalia's suggestion
in his Thornton concurrence, holding the context of an automobile allows a search incidental
to lawful arrest, when it is reasonable for the arresting officers to believe evidence of the ar-
resting offense might be found in the vehicle).
14 See id. at 1714 (holding that Chimel's safety and evidence protections are determina-
tive of Belton's scope; therefore Belton does not allow a search incident to lawful arrest of an
occupant who is no longer in the vehicle and is secured and is unable to access the interior of
the vehicle); Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714 (following Thornton and Justice Scalia's suggestion in
his Thornton concurrence, the context of an automobile allow a search incident to lawful ar-
rest of a vehicle, when it is reasonable for the arresting officers to believe evidence of the
arresting offense might be found in the vehicle).
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vehicles as advocated by Justice Scalia and endorsed by Justice
O'Connor.'47
Under this proposal of solely using Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in Gant, New York law would revert to being more protective
of privacy interests than the United States Constitution, as New York
law would continue to adhere to the Chimel requirements of potential
officer risk or evidence destruction as determined at the time of ar-
rest, and a case-by case determination of overall reasonableness as
stated by in Derrell.14 8
It would remain arguable whether this assumption of New
York being more protective of Fourth Amendment privacy rights
than the United States Constitution is accurate.149  While a case-by-
case determination approach according to Derrell makes New York
more protective of privacy rights, the uncertainty inherent in such a
New York approach has a net-loss in Fourth Amendment privacy
protection, because police and citizens would not know in simple
terms what is or is not protected. Moreover, the New York pre-Gant
approach would appear to be judicially unworkable. Requiring al-
ready overwhelmed New York courts to conduct case-by-case deter-
minations of facts and circumstances would be the height of judicial
inefficiency. Moreover, requiring the police to contend with two
constitutional standards would logically cause police uncertainty and
handcuff officials in performing their jobs. Ultimately, the police
will likely err on the side of caution, potentially missing or losing
important evidence relating to the crimes a person was arrested for.
A remaining problem according to both Justice Scalia and the
Gant opinion is how to exactly understand the parameters of the al-
lowable search of the vehicle for evidence related to the arresting
crime. Is this a probable cause concept? Justice Scalia apparently al-
luded to this when he stated that the criterion for arrest, which is
probable cause, continues to be the consistent determinative factor in
147 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that although
Thornton is a logical extension of Belton, she is dissatisfied with the state of the law in
search incident to arrest of automobiles, because Belton is on a "shaky foundation," and
quoting Justice Scalia's concurrence "lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to
search a vehicle incident to the arrest . . . as a police entitlement rather than as an exception
justified by the twin rationales of Chimel. . .").
148 See supra text accompanying notes 128-133.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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allowing a warrantless subsequent search.' 50 Or, as alluded to by Jus-
tice Stevens in Gant,'"' and Justice Scalia in Thornton,152 a seeming-
ly lower standard than probable cause, the concept of a reasonable
probability of evidence of the arresting crime?
While the aforementioned discussions are theoretical alterna-
tives to the outcome stated in Derrell, presently it is not the law.
Derrell correctly stated the view held by the majority in Gant, as well
as the predominant view pre-Gant how to understand Belton.'53 It
remains arguable whether the pre-Gant law in New York was or was
not more or less protective of the Fourth Amendment rights; but as
Derrell correctly stated, this is purely theoretical under post-Gant
law.
Maurice M LaBrie
"s0 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"s' See id. at 1714, 1723 (majority opinion).
152 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf Robbins, 453 U.S. at 444
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the "automobile exception" being allowed using both
terms in the same paragraph, "probable cause to believe the vehicles contained contraband,"
and at the end of the same paragraph "any containers in vehicle that might reasonably con-
tain the contraband").
5 Derrell, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 915-17.
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